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Insider: 
An insider is someone within an organization or with access to critical 
aspects of the organization. An insider can be an employee, contractor, 
consultant, or any person who has a relationship with or is in a position of 
trust within the organization. The insider may be someone acting alone or 
in collusion with others.
Threat: 
A threat posed by an insider to an organization can be intentional 
or the result of negligence on the part of the insider. Threats refer to 
behaviors and related actions that pose a risk to the organization, as 
opposed to the presentation of threatening language alone. Threats that 
are particularly concerning include sabotage, espionage, theft, politically 
motivated violence, terrorist acts, or general disruption to organizational 
infrastructure or security. Such threats may originate from inside or 
outside an organization. The actions that make up threats like sabotage, 
espionage, terrorist acts, or insider threats include a range of individual 
behaviors that are often referred to as behaviors of concern. 
Organization:
An organization may be a business, government agency, utility, or similar 
entity. Sometimes the organization is more broadly referred to as a target of  
the insider threat.
Insider Threat
This brochure presents a framework to view threats made by an insider that are targeted or intentional (as opposed to negligent or 
unintentional) and that involve some degree of deliberation (as opposed to 
those that may be considered impulsive).  The framework was developed 
with the assumption that it must: 
Be applicable for both anonymous and known subjects
Recognize interactions and patterns of behavior
Allow for investigation with whatever information is immediately 
available
Recognize that behaviors or warning activity may shift, decrease, or be 
emboldened by protective or organizational actions
Insider attacks are often handled internal to an organization and are under-reported to law enforcement agencies. This has limited the sample 
of insider threats available for research in this area. Most of the available 
literature related to insider threats exists in areas outside of behavioral 
science. It is generally conceptual in nature rather than data driven and 
often focuses on threats to information systems.
The field of threat assessment represents a blending of behavioral science, 
intelligence, and law enforcement strategies. It evolved from practices used 
to assess and manage dangerousness (potential risk for violence).
•
•
•
•
Three principles have created a foundation upon which behavioral science models in threat assessment have been built. These principles 
from the threat assessment approach have been applied to targeted 
violence and provide a framework for conceptualizing insider threats. 
Targeted violence is a process that takes place over time, during which 
the subject (person(s) posing the threat) must prepare and plan. 
Targeted violence results from the interaction of the subject, a stressful 
event or triggering condition and a setting that does not prevent the 
violence from occurring (context). 
Successful assessment of targeted violence involves identification of the 
subject’s continuum of attack-related behaviors (behaviors of concern). 
The actions that make up threats like sabotage, espionage, terrorist acts, or insider threats include a range of individual behaviors that are often 
referred to as behaviors of concern. Behaviors of concern become markers 
that can signal a threat when they are considered as the product of the 
interaction of factors related to the subject, the organization (target), or the 
context affecting both.  
1.
2.
3.
Insider Threat
Espionage
SabotageTerrorist Acts
Rather than relying on profiles to assemble risk information about insider 
threats, investigators should consider behavioral indicators in conjunction 
with environmental clues to assess motivations and other subject factors 
related to insider threats. 
This approach is distinct from the technique of offender profiling, which 
seeks to determine the type of individual most likely to commit a certain 
offense based on inferences made from crime scene characteristics. 
Creating a profile for someone posing a threat of targeted violence directed 
toward an organization would be difficult because it is a low base rate 
activity. A profiling approach would likely falsely identify a large number of 
individuals as potential risks while missing many of the people who really 
do pose a risk.
Organization of behavioral indicators and environmental clues in an insider 
threat investigation can be guided by asking key questions in specific areas 
of inquiry1.
Areas of Inquiry Critical Questions
Behaviors of Concern that Prompted       
Iinvestigation
What is the nature of the breach that 
caused the inquiry?
What other behaviors of concern were 
observed or later discovered?
•
•
Subject Factors Is the subject or suspect identified?
Are there other potential accomplices?
What are the potential motives for the 
behaviors of concern?
What personal characteristics of 
subject enhance and/or mitigate the 
threat?
How capable is the subject in carrying 
out the threat (e.g. access, expertise)?
What is the subject’s personal 
situation?
•
•
•
•
•
•
Protective Factors What are the human, technical and 
physical security measures in place?
What protective resources may have 
been compromised?
What was necessary to compromise 
protective factors (e.g. behavior, 
technical expertise, level of access)?
•
•
•
Organizational What is the organizational culture and 
climate for security and reporting?
What is the organizational history with 
regard to security compromises?
Are there recent events that could 
affect security and/or risk?
What is the nature of the asset being 
targeted within the organization?
•
•
•
•
Situational/Contextual What situational or contextual factors 
relate to the breach or attempted 
breach (e.g. political, media, social)?
•
1 A model for conceptualizing insider threats with more specific examples of what to 
look for is on pages 8-11.
Protective Factors
.human . technical . physical . security
Target/Organizational Factors
. national security value / criticality of the 
asset . security and reporting climate 
within the targeted organization . barriers 
to emplolyees sharing security concerns . 
organizational sensitivity to reporting and 
addressing security breeches 
Subject Factors
. history of malicious activity and related 
attitudes . personal vulnerabilities (finan-
cial problems, substance abuse) . symp-
toms of mental illness (emotional instabil-
ity, paranoia) . dual identity or conflicting 
loyalty . technical expertise . motives 
(employer / institutional grievances, politi-
cal or ideological issues, financial / greed, 
personal stressors)
Situational/Contextual Factors
. political climate . recent national or international events of note (politically controver-
sial issues, recent terrorism activity, recent hoax activity, increased rhetoric related to  
extremist issues)
BREACH: may include acts of espionage, theft, violence, or sabotage perpetrated by 
an insider
Warning Signs/Behaviors of Concern:
boundary violations within target/organization . information technology or other technical 
violations . threatening/intimidating behavior . problematic travel and related behavior 
with foreign entities . concerning financial behavior . acts suggesting organizational or 
national disloyalty.
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Behavioral Science Insider Threat Model
Behaviors of Concern and Behavioral Warning Signs 
Suggested From Literature Review 
(Factors from Empirical Studies in Italics)
Type of Behavior of Concern Behavioral Indicators
Work-related Boundry Violations Attempts to gain authorized access 
to accounts beyond the scope of an 
employee’s job responsibilities
Accessing materials or attempts to 
access materials not appropriate to job 
responsibilities
Stealing items from work
Undue curiosity or requests for 
information about matters not within 
the scope of the insider’s need to 
know
Asking others to facilitate access to 
information with which the insider does 
not have access
Unauthorized attempts to remove 
material from the work area
Taking classified material home or on 
trips
Unusual work hours—especially if less 
supervision or vigilance is likely 
Storing classified material at home
Unauthorized work at home
Bringing unauthorized cameras or 
recording devices to work and/or 
not using them in relation to a social 
function
Recent isolation from coworkers
Extensive use of the copy, facsimile, 
or computer equipment to reproduce 
or transmit documents that may 
exceed job requirements
Testing reactions to security threats
Improper escorting of visitors
Suspicion of media leaks
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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10
Type of Behavior of Concern Behavioral Indicators
IT / Technical Violations
Pattern of security violations
Stealing administrative level 
passwords
Attempts to get coworkers to share 
passwords
Attempts to create unnecessary 
shared accounts
Attempts to bypass technical 
safeguards 
Hacking activity or statements i.e.: 
ability to do so
Lax security habits
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Threatening / Intimidating Behavior Increased outbursts/ aggressive 
posturing directed at coworkers
Strong reactions to organizational 
sanctions
Escalation during work-related 
conflicts
Verbal or physical intimidation of 
others
Verbal or physical threats
Violence at worksite or target site, 
bragging of violent activity at other 
venues
Stalking behaviors
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Financial Spending on fantasy-related items
Approaching a former coworker for 
help in changing financial data
Increasing complaints to supervisors 
regarding salary dissatisfaction 
Unexplained affluence
Reckless or compulsive spending 
trends, gambling
Unexplained cash
Overspending, credit problems
Reports of calls from creditors at home 
or work
Denial of credit
Garnishments
Bounced/ bad checks
Bankruptcy 
Negligent/ late child or spouse support 
payments
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
11
Type of Behavior of Concern Behavioral Indicators
Misuse of Travel / Issues with Foreign 
Contact
Unreported contact with foreign 
nationals, government, military, or 
intelligence officials
Unauthorized travel
Vague/ evasive, e.g.: recent travel 
Short trips to foreign countries for 
unusual or unexplained reasons
Failure to comply with regulations for 
reporting foreign contacts or foreign 
travel
•
•
•
•
•
Disloyalty Behaviors indicating disloyalty to U.S. 
(e.g., possession and use of a foreign 
passport)
Associating with people who advocate 
use of actions against the U.S.
Actions indicating a fascination with or 
desire to engage in “spy work”
Actions to detect physical surveillance: 
searching for listening devices/
cameras, leaving traps to detect 
search
Sympathetic references to foreign 
interests/issues
•
•
•
•
•
The University of Nebraska, operating under a contract with Mantech Interna-
tional and funding from the Department of Defense Counterintelligence Field 
Activity Office, was asked to develop behavioral science guidelines related to 
the detection of insider threats. The project began with a survey of available 
literature followed by a series of facilitated expert panel sessions to inform the 
development of these guidelines. The study of insider threats is dynamic. These 
guidelines are based on what we know today and are sure to evolve as we learn 
more about them through research and practice.
An open-source and classified version of the project findings are available 
through the Department of Defense Counterintelligence Field Activity Office. 
For further information, contact Denise Bulling, Ph.D. at dbulling@nebraska.edu 
or Mario Scalora, Ph.D. at mscalora1@unl.edu.
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